

Carnegie Mellon
Software Engineering Institute

Securing Public Web Servers

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SECURITY IMPROVEMENT MODULE
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Preface

This document is one of a series of publications of the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University called *security improvement modules*. They are intended to provide practical guidance to help organizations improve the security of their networked computer systems.

Module structure

Each module addresses an important but relatively narrowly defined problem in network and system security. The first section of the module describes the problem and outlines a set of *security improvement practices* to help solve it. Each practice is a recommended way of performing common tasks related to the secure operation of networked computer systems.

The remaining sections of the module are detailed descriptions of the practices. Each includes a rationale for the recommended actions and a description of how to perform them.

Intended audience

The practices are primarily written for system and network administrators whose day-to-day activities include installation, configuration, and maintenance of the computers and networks. Occasionally, practices are written to assist the managers responsible for network and system administration.

Revised versions

Network and system technologies continue to evolve rapidly, leading to new security problems and solutions. Modules and practices need to be revised occasionally, so to permit more timely publication of new versions, we also publish them on the World Wide Web. At the end of each section of this document is the URL of its Web version.

Implementation details

How an organization adopts and implements the practices often depends on the networking and computing technologies it uses. For some practices, technology-specific implementation details are published on the World Wide Web. The Web version of each practice contains links to the implementation details.

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Securing Public Web Servers

The World Wide Web is one of the most important ways for your organization to publish information, interact with Internet users, and establish an e-commerce business presence. However, if you are not rigorous in securely configuring and operating a public Web site, you leave yourself and your organization vulnerable to a variety of security problems. You could find yourself in an embarrassing situation because malicious intruders have changed the content of your Web pages.

Compromised Web sites have served as the entry point for intrusions into an organization's internal networks for the purpose of accessing confidential information. Your organization can face business losses or legal action if an intruder successfully violates the confidentiality of customer data. Denial-of-service attacks can make it difficult, if not impossible, for users to access your Web site. This is especially critical if you are using your site to conduct business.

The practices recommended below are designed to help you mitigate the risks associated with these and several other known security problems. They build upon and assume the implementation of all practices described in the security improvement module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00]. You need to ensure that you first configure a secure general purpose server before tailoring its configuration to operate as a public Web server.

Who should read these practices

These practices are applicable to your organization if you intend to operate your own public Web site to conduct business with the Internet community and share information.¹ Practices in this module are written for system and Web server administrators and their managers.

We assume that you have these security requirements for your Web site:

- You want to maintain the integrity of all information resident on and accessible by your Web site.

1. Some of these practices may also be useful in securing an Intranet-based enterprise Web server against insider attacks.

- You want to prevent the use of your Web host² as a staging area for intrusions into your organization's network that could result in breaches of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information resources.
- You want to prevent the use of the Web host as a staging area for intrusions into external sites, which could result in your organization being held liable for damages.

What these practices do not cover

These practices do not cover all aspects of using Web technology. In particular, they do not address

- securing a general purpose network server. Practices to accomplish this are described in *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00].
- firewalls and routers used to protect Web servers. Some of the practices necessary to accomplish this are described in *Deploying Firewalls* [Fithen 99].
- security considerations related to Web client (browser) software
- commercial transactions via the Web (with the exception of a brief description of Secure Electronic Transaction [SET])
- special considerations for very large Web sites with multiple hosts
- contracting for or offering Web-hosting services (such as those provided by a commercial Internet service provider)
- other public information services, such as those based on the file transfer protocol (FTP)
- privacy protection and anonymity, specifically protecting personal identify and preferences that are available to Web servers (such as name, location, computer used, browser used, last URL visited)
- protection of intellectual property

Security issues

There are three main security issues related to the operation of a public Web site:

1. Improper configuration or operation of the Web server can result in the inadvertent disclosure or alteration of confidential information. This can include
 - information assets of your organization
 - information about the configuration of the server or network that could be exploited for subsequent attacks
 - information about who requested which documents from the server
 - sensitive customer or user information
2. The host used for your Web server might be compromised. This could allow intruders to
 - change the information stored on the Web server host machine, particularly the information you intend to publish
 - execute unauthorized commands or programs on the server host machine including ones that the intruder has installed

2. Throughout these practices, we use terms such as *host* and *host machine* to refer to the hardware and operating system that will support a Web site. The term *server software* refers to the application software that implements the http protocol and any associated security layers. The term *server* generally means the combined hardware, operating system, and server software.

- gain unauthorized access to resources elsewhere in your organization's computer network
 - launch attacks on external sites from your server host machine, thus concealing the intruders' identities, and perhaps making your organization liable for damages
3. Users can be unable to access your Web site if all of its resources are consumed by a denial-of-service attack.

Security improvement approach

To improve the security of your public Web site, we recommend a three-step approach. It requires implementing security practices in these areas:

1. *installing* a secure server. Refer to the module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00].
2. *configuring* Web server software and the underlying Web server host operating system
3. *maintaining* the Web server's integrity

Summary of recommended practices

Area	Recommended Practice
Configuring server technology	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isolate the Web server from public networks and your organization's internal networks. 2. Configure the Web server with appropriate object, device, and file access controls. 3. Identify and enable Web-server-specific logging mechanisms. 4. Consider security implications before selecting programs, scripts, and plug-ins for your Web server. 5. Configure the Web server to minimize the functionality of programs, scripts, and plug-ins. 6. Configure the Web server to use authentication and encryption technologies, where required.
Maintaining server integrity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Maintain the authoritative copy of your Web site content on a secure host. 8. Protect your Web server against common attacks.

Abbreviations used in these practices

ASCII	American Standard Code for Information Interchange
CA	Certificate Authority
CGI	Common Gateway Interface
CLF	Common Log Format
DDOS	Distributed Denial Of Service
DoS	Denial of Service
ELF	Extended Log Format
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
HTML	HyperText Markup Language
HTTP	HyperText Transfer Protocol
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force

IP	Internet Protocol
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MD5	Message Digest 5
PERL	Practical Extraction and Report Language
PGP	Pretty Good Privacy
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
RFC	Request For Comment
SET	Secure Electronic Transaction
SH	SHell
S/HTTP	Secure HyperText Transport Protocol
SMTP	Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SQL	Standard Query Language
SSL	Secure Socket Layer
TCL	Tool Command Language
TCP/IP	Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TLS	Transport Level Security
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WORM	Write Once Read Many
WWW	World Wide Web

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Where to find updates

The latest version of this module is available on the Web at URL
<http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/modules/m11.html>

1

Isolate the Web server from public networks and your organization's internal networks.

You have several choices for placing a public Web server on your organization's network. We recommend that you place it on a separate, protected subnetwork. This will ensure that traffic between the Internet and the server does not traverse any part of your private internal network and that no internal network traffic is visible to the server.

Why this is important

A public Web server host is a computer intended for public access. This means that there will be many people who will access the host (and its stored information) from locations all over the world. Regardless of how well the host computer and its application software are configured, there is always the chance that someone will discover a new vulnerability, exploit it, and gain unauthorized access to the Web server host (e.g., via a user account or a privileged account on a host with a multiuser operating system). If that occurs, you need to prevent these subsequent events, if possible:

- The intruder is able to observe or capture network traffic that is flowing between internal hosts. Such traffic might include authentication information, proprietary business information, personnel data, and many other kinds of sensitive data.
- The intruder is able to get to internal hosts, or to obtain detailed information about them.

To guard against these two threats, the public Web server host must be isolated from your internal network and its traffic, as well as from any public network.

How to do it

- *Place the Web server on a subnet isolated from public and internal networks.*

By doing so, network traffic destined for the Web server subnet can be better monitored and controlled. This aids in configuring any firewall or router used to protect access to the subnet as well as detecting attacks and attempted intrusions. It also precludes the capture of internal traffic (accessible to all connected computers when using broadcast media such as Ethernet) by any intruder who gains access to your Web server.

- *Use firewall technology to restrict traffic between a public network and the Web server, and between the Web server and internal networks.*

The use of firewall technology¹ (including packet filtering implemented by a router) effectively restricts the traffic between all computers connected to the firewall in accordance with your security policy. Setting up firewall technology precludes many possible attacks but still allows anyone to access your public Web server content.

1. Refer to the module *Deploying Firewalls* [Fithen 99].

A Web server typically accepts TCP connections on port 80/tcp (http), the standard port. In general, no other connections from the public network to the Web server should be permitted. However, if the Web server supports SSL²-protected connections, port 443/tcp (https) should be permitted.

You need to establish filtering rules that block TCP connections originating from the Web server, as a Web server typically does not depend on other services on the public network. In general, all UDP and ICMP traffic should be blocked. However, depending on the Web server configuration, you may need to permit limited connections to UDP-based services such as DNS for host name lookup (permit port 53/udp).³

One recommended configuration is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Network configuration for a public Web server

The router/firewall host can consist of

- a single computer
- multiple computers, one which may filter traffic to and from the Web server, and one or more which may filter traffic to and from the internal network.

➤ *Place server hosts providing supporting services on another subnet isolated from public and internal networks.*

Public Web sites rely on services which are likely to (or should) reside on other servers. As a result, you must consider the network placement of these server hosts when you determine the location of your Web server.

-
2. Refer to the practice "Configure the Web server to use authentication and encryption technologies, where required."
 3. UDP is a connectionless protocol. As a result, packet filtering firewalls cannot verify sender and receiver without keeping track of the state of the DNS request. This is usually called "stateful inspection" and is available with some firewalls. You should only permit connections from your Web server to your internal DNS server (for DNS lookups in the public network). The internal DNS server can then relay requests to the appropriate external DNS server for resolution.

Your Web site may use the following services:

- email services (SMTP) to send data submitted by users using an HTML form to an internal address via a CGI script or program.

The configuration (network, SMTP, firewall) should prohibit

- the sending of email to addresses outside of your internal network, given that the email was generated as a result of a user filling out a form. The user's information, as well as your organization's identity, need to be protected.
- receiving email on the Web server itself, which may allow the SMTP server software to be compromised. This could then affect the Web server.
- directory services (such as LDAP) to retrieve previously stored user information (this provides customized information back to the user) or to provide information such as X.509 certificates used to authenticate users as they are accessing specific content services
- database services (such as SQL) to retrieve up-to-date content information to support the generation of dynamic Web pages and user-specified searches

Place servers providing email, directory, and database services in support of a public Web site on protected subnetworks.

Use firewall technology to

- block any traffic between the Internet and these servers
- prohibit traffic between the Web server and these other servers from traversing any part of your private internal network
- prohibit any user from connecting directly to any of these servers. Permitting such a connection may allow specific attacks against the software residing on these servers.

Restrict communication between these servers to only that which is required to support your public Web site.

One recommended network configuration for public Web server database services is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Network configuration for database services used in support of a public Web server

- *Disable source routing on all routers and firewalls that protect your public Web server.*

Source routing is a function of IP routing that allows the packet originator to influence routing decisions as the packet traverses the networks. We recommend that you disable all source routing functions in your firewalls and routers and that, if possible, you deny any packets that have specified source routing options.

- *Disable IP forwarding and source routing on the Web server and server hosts that provide supporting services.*

Disable source routing on the public Web server and any servers providing supporting services such as email, directory, and database.

In addition, disable IP forwarding on these servers. This eliminates the case where packets can appear to have originated from a known (and trusted) host when they have, in fact, originated from the public network.

Policy considerations

Your organization's networked systems security policy should require that

- your public servers be placed on subnets that are separate from public networks and from your internal network
- servers providing supporting services for your public servers be placed on subnets separate from public networks, from your public servers, and from your internal networks

- routers and firewalls be configured to restrict traffic between public networks and your public servers, and between your public servers and internal networks
- routers and firewalls be configured to restrict traffic between servers providing supporting services for your public server and public networks, your public server, and your internal networks

Other information

Alternative public Web server architecture approaches may mitigate the security risks mentioned above, but these approaches generate other issues that you need to address.

1. You may choose to place the Web server on an internal network and then use smart hubs or switches to separate it from internal network traffic. You could also choose to encrypt all internal traffic, so that even if the server is compromised, any traffic it sees will not be readable. However, neither of these approaches would prevent traffic from being sent from the Web server host to other hosts on your internal network.
2. You may choose to have your public Web server hosted by an external organization (such as an ISP) to accomplish the separation of your public Web site from your internal network, and to take advantage of external expertise. If you take this approach, require that your ISP establish a protected subnet for your Web server and any other services (e.g. email, directory, or database) if these are also provided.

Servers that host these services should be co-located with the Web server. If you choose to keep, for example, the database server within your internal network, you may need to consider such technologies as virtual private networks (VPNs) to more securely transfer information between your externally-hosted public Web server and your internal database server. The details of this approach are beyond the scope of this practice.

In addition, require the use of strong authentication and encryption techniques to protect the connection from your internal hosts to your externally-hosted public Web server. This is necessary when transferring Web server content as well as when performing any server administration not done by the ISP.

Where to find updates

The latest version of this practice, plus implementation details for selected technologies, is available on the Web at URL

<http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/practices/p075.html>

2

Configure the Web server with appropriate object, device, and file access controls.

Most Web server host operating systems provide the capability to specify access privileges individually for files, devices, and other data or code objects stored on that host¹. Any information that your Web server can access using these controls can potentially be distributed to all users accessing your public Web site. Your Web server software is likely to provide additional object, device, and file access controls specific to its operation. You need to consider how best to configure these access controls to protect information stored on your public Web server from two perspectives:

- to limit the access of your Web server software
- to apply access controls specific to the Web server where more detailed levels of access control are required

The proper setting of access controls can help prevent the disclosure of sensitive or restricted information that is not intended for public dissemination. In addition, access controls can be used to limit resource use in the event of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against your public Web site.

Why this is important

A public Web server typically stores information intended for widespread publication. It may also store information requiring restricted access such as

- server log files
- system software and configuration files
- applications software and configuration files
- password files

Using the access controls provided by both the server operating system and by the Web server software can reduce the likelihood of inadvertent information disclosure or corruption, and violations of confidentiality and integrity.

In addition, using access controls to limit resource use can reduce the impact of a DoS attack, a violation of availability.

How to do it

- *Configure the Web server to execute only under a unique individual user and group identity.*

Establish new user and group identities to be used exclusively by the Web server software.

-
1. Refer to the practice "Configure computer operating systems with appropriate object, device, and files access controls" within the module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00].

Make this new user and new group independent and unique from all other users and groups. This is a prerequisite for implementing the access controls described in the following steps.

Although the server may have to run as root (UNIX) or administrator (Windows NT) initially to bind to port 80, do not allow the server to continue to run in this mode.

➤ *Identify the protection needed for files, devices, and objects specific to the Web server.*

The general approach for identifying required access controls for files, devices, and objects specific to Web servers is outlined in the practice "Configure computer operating systems with appropriate object, device, and file access controls" within the module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00].

In addition, determine if your Web server's operating system provides the capability to limit files accessed by the Web services' processes. These processes should have read-only access to those files necessary to perform the service and should have no access to other files (such as server log files). If this capability is not available, you can skip some of the following steps. In this event, you need to implement other security controls (described below) to limit your exposure.

Use Web server host operating system access controls to enforce the following:

- Public Web content files can be read but not written by Web service processes.
- The directories where public Web content is stored cannot be written by Web service processes.
- Public Web content files can be written only by processes authorized for Web server administration.
- Web server log files can be written by service processes but log files cannot be read or served as Web content. Web server log files can be read only by administration processes.
- Any temporary files created by Web service processes (such as those that might be generated in the creation of dynamic Web pages) are restricted to a specified and appropriately protected subdirectory.
- Access to any temporary files created by Web service processes are limited to the service processes that created these files.

Some of these controls are reiterated below when they can be achieved using alternate methods.

➤ *Limit the use of resources by the Web server host operating system to mitigate the effects of DoS attacks.*

Resource-intensive DoS attacks against a Web server host operating system include:

- filling file systems with extraneous and incorrect information. Some systems will not function if specific resources (such as file systems) are unavailable.
- filling primary memory with unnecessary processes to slow down the system and limit Web service availability

Logging information generated by the Web server host operating system may help in recognizing such attacks.

Provide the following controls to mitigate the effects of such attacks:

- Separate directories for log files and other information from system directories and user information. You can establish effective boundaries between these information objects by specifying separate partitions and/or disk locations.
- Assigning priorities to Web service processes can help to ensure that high priority processes obtain sufficient resources, even while under attack. Note, however, that doing so may create the potential for a denial of service on the lower priority services.

These controls will not fully protect your Web server against DoS attacks. However, by reducing the impact of these attacks, the Web server may be able to “survive” during the time period when the DoS attacks are occurring.

➤ *Configure time-outs and other controls to mitigate the effects of DoS attacks.*

Another type of DoS attack takes advantage of the number of simultaneous network connections by quickly establishing connections up to the maximum permitted such that no new, legitimate users can gain access.

Network connection time-outs (time after which an inactive connection is dropped) should be set to a minimum acceptable time setting. Established connections will then timeout as quickly as possible, opening up new connections to legitimate users. This only mitigates the effects; it does not defeat the attack.

If the maximum number of open connections (or connections that are half-open, i.e., the first part of the TCP handshake was successful) is set to a low number, an attacker can easily consume the available connections with bogus requests. By setting the maximum to a much higher number, the impact of such attacks may be reduced, but additional resources will be consumed.

As above, it is worth noting that these controls will not fully protect your Web server against DoS attacks. However, by reducing the impact of these attacks, the Web server may be able to “survive” during the time period when the DoS attacks are occurring.

➤ *Configure the public Web server so it cannot serve files that are outside of the specified file directory tree for public Web content.*

This may be a configuration choice in the server software or it may be a choice in how the server process is controlled by the operating system. Ensure that such files (outside of the specified directory tree) cannot be served, even if users know the names (URLs) of those files.

Avoid the use of links or aliases in your public Web content file directory tree that point to files elsewhere on your server host or your network file system. If possible, disable the ability for Web server software to follow links and aliases. As stated earlier, Web server log files and configuration files should reside outside of the specified file directory tree for public Web content.

In the event that you do need to access files via your public Web server that are sensitive or restricted, refer to the practice “Configure the Web server to use authentication and encryption technologies, where required.”

➤ *Configure Web server software access controls.*

Perform the following steps:

- Define a single directory and establish related sub-directories exclusively for Web server content files, including graphics but excluding CGI scripts and other programs.
- Define a single directory exclusively for all external programs executed as part of Web server content.
- Disable the execution of CGI scripts that are not exclusively under the control of administrative accounts. This is accomplished by creating and controlling access to a separate directory intended to contain authorized CGI scripts.
- Disable the use of hard or symbolic links as ordinary files and directories.
- Define a complete Web content access matrix. Identify which pages are restricted and which pages are accessible (and by whom).

Most Web server software vendors provide directives or commands that allow you to restrict user access to public Web server content files. For example, the Apache Web server software provides a Limit directive, which allows you to restrict which optional access features (such as New, Delete, Connect, Head, and Get) are associated with each Web content file. The Apache Require directive allows you to restrict available content to authenticated users or groups².

Many of the directives or commands can be overridden on a per directory basis. The convenience of being able to make local exceptions to global policy is offset by the threat of a security hole being introduced in a distant subdirectory — which could be controlled by a hostile user. You should disable a subdirectory's ability to override top-level security directives unless that override is required.

➤ *Disable the serving of Web server file directory listings.*

The Web protocol (HTTP) specifies that a URL ending in a slash character is treated as a request for a listing of the files in the directory with that name. As a general rule, you should prohibit your server from responding to such requests, even if all of the files in the directory can be read by the general public.

Such requests may indicate an attempt to locate information by means other than that intended by your Web site. Users may attempt this if they are having difficulty navigating through your site or if a link appears to be broken. Intruders may attempt this to locate information hidden by your Web site's interface. You may want to investigate requests of this type found in your server log files.

Policy considerations

Your organization's networked systems security policy should require that public servers be configured to take maximum advantage of all available object, device, and file access controls to protect information as identified elsewhere in your security policy. Your organization's information access control policy should address information residing on any public server including Web servers.

Where to find updates

The latest version of this practice, plus implementation details for selected technologies, is available on the Web at URL <http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/practices/p076.html>

2. Refer to the practice "Configure the Web server to use authentication and encryption technologies, where required."

3

Identify and enable Web-server-specific logging mechanisms.

Collecting data generated by the Web server provides you with critical information that is essential for analyzing the security of the Web server and detecting signs of intrusion.

When you install Web server software, you are normally presented with a number of choices for logging configuration options or preferences. Different systems provide various types of logging information; some systems do not collect adequate information in their default configuration. You need to make choices based on your security policy and requirements.

While the server host operating system may provide some basic logging mechanisms and data¹, these mechanisms typically cannot provide sufficient data that is relevant to the performance of your public Web server, such as Web pages retrieved or attacks intended to probe your Web server for specific vulnerabilities. You should identify the types of logs available, identify the data recorded within each log, and then enable the collection of the desired data.

Why this is important

Log files are often the only record of suspicious behavior. Failure to enable the mechanisms to record this information and use them to initiate alert mechanisms will greatly weaken or eliminate your ability to detect intrusion attempts and to determine whether or not they succeeded. Similar problems can result from not having the necessary procedures and tools in place to process and analyze your log files.

As a general case, system and network logs can alert you that a suspicious event has occurred that requires further investigation. Web server software can provide additional log data relevant to Web-specific events. If you do not take advantage of these capabilities, Web-relevant log data may not be visible or may require a great deal of effort to access.

You may need Web server logs to

- alert you to suspicious activity that requires further investigation
- determine the extent of an intruder's activity
- help you to recover your systems
- help you to conduct an investigation
- provide information required for legal proceedings

1. Refer to the practice "Identify and enable system and network logging mechanisms" within the security improvement module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00].

How to do it

The selection and implementation of specific Web server software will determine which set of detailed instructions you should follow to establish logging configurations. Logging capabilities can be similar across several implementations. With this said, some of the guidance contained in the steps below may not be fully applicable to all vendors' Web server software products.

➤ *Identify the Web server software information to be logged.*

Four different logs may exist:

- **Transfer Log:** Each transfer is represented as one entry showing the main information related to the transfer (see below).
- **Error Log:** Each error is represented as one entry including some explanation of the reason for this error report.
- **Agent Log:** If this log is available, it contains information about the user client software used in accessing your Web content.
- **Referer Log:** If this log is available, it collects information relevant to HTTP access. This includes the URL of the page that contained the link that the user client software followed to initiate the access to your Web page.

Several log formats are available for Transfer Log entries. Typically, the information is presented in plain ASCII without special delimiters to separate the different fields:

- **Common Log Format (CLF):**

This format stores the following information related to one transfer (Transfer Log) in the indicated order:

1. Remote Host
2. Remote User Identity in accordance with RFC 1413²
3. Authenticated User in accordance with the Basic Authentication Scheme³
4. Date
5. URL requested
6. Status of the request
7. Number of bytes actually transferred

- **Combined Log Format:**

The Combined Log Format contains the same seven fields above. It also provides information normally stored in the Agent Log and the Referer Log, along with the actual transfer. Keeping this information in a consolidated log format may support more effective administration.

2. Refer to <http://www.ietf.org>

3. Refer to the practice "Configure the Web server to use authentication and encryption technologies, where required."

- Extended Log Format (ELF):

This format provides a way to describe all items that should be collected within the log file. The first two lines of the log file contain the version and the fields to be collected.

It appears in the log file as follows:

```
#Version: 1.0
#Fields: date time c-ip sc-bytes time-taken cs-version
1999-08-01 02:10:57 192.0.0.2 6340 3 HTTP/1.0
```

This example contains the date, time, originating IP address, number of bytes transmitted, time taken for transmission, and the HTTP version.

- Other log file formats:

Some server software provides log information in different file formats such as database formats or delimiter-separated formats. Other server software provides the capability for an administrator to define specific log file formats in the Web server configuration file using a particular syntax (if the default CLF format is insufficient).

➤ *Determine if additional logging mechanisms are required for program, scripts, and plug-ins.*

If your public Web server supports the execution of programs, scripts, or plug-ins, you need to determine whether specific logging data needs to be captured regarding the performance of these features. If you develop your own programs, scripts, or plug-ins, we strongly recommend that you define and implement a comprehensive and easy-to-understand logging approach based on the logging mechanisms provided by the Web server hosting operating system. Log information associated with programs, scripts, and plug-ins can add significantly to the typical information logged by the Web server.

➤ *Enable Web server logging.*

We recommend the following:

- Use the Combined Log Format for storing the Transfer Log or manually configure the information described by the Combined Log Format to be the standard format for the Transfer Log.
- Enable the Referer Log or Agent Log if the Combined Log Format is not available.
- Establish different log file names for different virtual hosts that may be implemented as part of a single Web server.
- Use the Remote User Identity as specified in RFC 1413.
- Some Web server software provides the capability to enforce or disable the checking of specified access controls during program startup. This level of control may be helpful to, for example, avoid inadvertent alteration of log files as a result of errors in file access administration. You should determine the circumstances under which you may want to enable such checks if your Web server software supports this feature.

➤ *Select and configure Web server log file analysis tools.*

Many commercial and public-domain⁴ tools are available to support regular analysis of Transfer Logs. Most operate on either the Common or the Combined Log Formats.

These tools can identify IP addresses that are the source of high numbers of connections, transfers, etc.

Error Log tools indicate not only errors that may exist within publicly available Web content (such as missing files) but also attempts to access non-existing URLs. Such attempts could indicate

- probes for the existence of vulnerabilities to be used later in launching an attack
- information gathering
- interest in specific content such as databases

Any suspicious log file events should be forwarded to the responsible administrator or security incident response team as soon as possible for follow-up investigation.

Other information

Refer to the modules *Detecting Signs of Intrusion* [Firth 97], *Preparing to Detect Signs of Intrusion* [Kochmar 98], and *Responding to Intrusions* [Kossakowski 99].

Where to find updates

The latest version of this practice, plus implementation details for selected technologies, is available on the Web at URL

<http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/practices/p077.html>

4. Refer to the implementation “Installing, configuring, and using swatch 2.2 to analyze log messages on systems running Solaris 2.x” available at <http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/implementations/i042.01.html>, and to the implementation “Installing, configuring, and using logsurfer 1.5 to analyze log messages on systems running Solaris 2.x” available at <http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/implementations/i042.02.html>.

4

Consider security implications before selecting programs, scripts, and plug-ins for your Web server.

In its most basic form, a Web server listens for a request and responds by transmitting the specified file to the requestor. A Web server may invoke additional mechanisms to execute programs or process user-supplied data, producing customized information in response to a request. Examples of these mechanisms include Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts and server plug-ins. You need to consider security implications when selecting these mechanisms.

CGI is an accepted standard that supports the extension of Web server software by adding external programs that are invoked by requesting a specific URL. CGI programs or scripts (see below) run as subtasks of the Web server. Arguments are supplied in the environment or via standard inputs. Outputs of a CGI script are returned to the requesting Web browser. CGI scripts can be used to interface to search engines and databases, create dynamic Web pages, and respond to user input.

A **script** is a program written in a scripting language and executed by an interpreter. Examples of such languages include SH (shell), PERL, TCL, Python, JavaScript, and VBScript.

A **plug-in**¹ serves as an extension of another program. Plug-ins provide additional functionality (such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL)²) or improved server performance (such as PERL). In the case of a PERL CGI script, no external program needs to be started each time such a script is invoked.

Another commonly used term is **servlet**. Servlet programs are typically written in Java and are either invoked as CGI scripts or may accept a TCP connection and interact with the Web browser directly.

Why this is important

Security vulnerabilities can be easily introduced in the acquisition, installation, configuration, deployment, and operation of programs, scripts, and plug-ins (collectively referred to as external programs in this practice). As a Web server administrator, you may install a specific set of external programs that result in a unique configuration—one that has likely not been tested by the developers of your Web server software or the external programs. Vulnerabilities may include poorly written programs never intended for wide-scale use or unexpected side effects that are created when two or more programs are installed that were not intended to operate together. For example, many successful attacks on Web sites have exploited known vulnerabilities in commonly available CGI scripts.

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1. Plug-ins can be used with Web browsers to add multimedia features such as video viewing.
 2. Refer to the practice "Configure the Web server to use authentication and encryption technologies, where required."

How to do it

- *Perform necessary cost/benefit trade-offs before selecting external programs.*

Consider

- the functionality that each external program provides. Decide if it is important to have this functionality, or if it would just be nice to have but *not* essential.
- the external program's ease of installation, configuration, testing, and maintenance
- the potential security vulnerabilities introduced by the external program and the inherent risks to your public Web site
- the potential security vulnerabilities introduced by two or more external programs when used in combination

- *Select programs, scripts, and plug-ins from trustworthy sources.*

To the extent possible, assess the trustworthiness of various sources for external programs. If there are several programs that provide the required functionality, choose one from a trustworthy source. Avoid external programs produced by unknown authors or downloaded from unknown, untrusted Internet sites.

- *Make sure that you understand all of the functionality that an external program provides.*

Some types of external programs (in particular CGI scripts) are distributed in source code form. If you have any doubts about the trustworthiness of the source or the authenticity of the code, conduct a thorough source code review.

When you examine a script, consider the following questions:³

- How complex is the script? The longer it is, the more likely it is to have problems.
- Does it read or write files on the host system? Programs that read files may inadvertently violate access restrictions or pass sensitive system information. Programs that write files may modify or damage documents or introduce Trojan horses.
- Does it interact with other programs? For example, many CGI scripts send email in response to form input by opening up a connection with the sendmail program. Is it doing this in a secure way?
- Does it run with suid (set-user-id) privileges? In general, this is not recommended and should not be permitted if at all possible.
- Does the author validate user inputs from forms? This demonstrates that the author is thinking about security.
- Does the author use explicit path names when invoking external programs? Relying on the PATH environment variable to resolve partial path names is not recommended.

- *Review publicly available information to identify vulnerabilities in the external programs you are considering.*

Various organizations research network and system security topics and periodically publish information concerning recently discovered vulnerabilities in service software. This includes Web server software and supporting technologies such as scripting languages and external programs. External programs that are in widescale use are regularly analyzed by researchers, users, and security incident response teams as well as by members of the intruder community.

3. This list is taken from "The World Wide Web Security FAQ" [Stein 99], specifically Q34.

Intruders will often publish exploit scripts that take advantage of known vulnerabilities in Web service software and external programs commonly used by public Web servers. You need to review public information sources frequently and be aware of all relevant security information about any external programs that you are considering.

Policy considerations	Your organization's networked systems security policy should require a security evaluation as part of your Web server software selection process.
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Other information	<p>CERT/CC advisories, summaries, vulnerability notes, and incident notes⁴ occasionally include information on new vulnerabilities, recent attacks, tools, and trends relevant to Web server software.</p> <p>Refer to the practice "Keep operating systems and applications software up to date" within the module <i>Securing Network Servers</i> [Allen 00], and to the implementation "Maintaining currency by periodically reviewing public and vendor information sources" available at http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/implementations/i040.01.html.</p> <p>Refer to "The World Wide Web Security FAQ" [Stein 99], specifically Q35, and CERT advisories⁴ for information about CGI scripts that are known to contain security holes.</p>
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Where to find updates	<p>The latest version of this practice, plus implementation details for selected technologies, is available on the Web at URL</p> <p>http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/practices/p078.html</p>
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4. <http://www.cert.org>.

5

Configure the Web server to minimize the functionality of programs, scripts, and plug-ins.

Programs, scripts, and plug-ins (collectively referred to as external programs in this practice) can add valuable and useful functionality to your public Web service. They are widely available from many different sources. You can add them to the Web server at any time without having to modify the server code. If your Web service requirements can only be met through the use of external programs, you need to thoroughly review and determine how these external programs will be configured, used, and administered. Your goal should be to restrict their functionality to the greatest extent possible to keep potential security risks to a minimum.¹

Why this is important

Security vulnerabilities can be easily introduced in the acquisition, installation, configuration, deployment, and operation of external programs. Vulnerabilities may include poorly written programs never intended for wide-scale use, or unexpected side effects that are created when two or more programs are installed that were not intended to operate together. For example, many successful attacks on Web sites have exploited known vulnerabilities in commonly available CGI scripts. However, your organization may choose to use such programs to provide a needed capability.

As a Web server administrator, you need to make sure that you limit the access rights, functionality, and potential for damage by such programs to reduce the likelihood of a security compromise.

How to do it

- *Verify that the acquired copy of an external program is an authentic copy.*

Typically, the authenticity of a copy can be verified using cryptographic checksums, digital signatures, or similar technologies provided by the external program's distributor.

Scan all external programs for computer viruses and Trojan horses.

- *Exercise all acquired external programs on a test machine isolated from your internal network prior to operational use.*

Some types of external programs, in particular CGI scripts, are distributed in source code form. If you have any reservations about the features of the external program, you can additionally conduct a source code review.¹

1. See also the practice "Consider security implications before installing programs, scripts, and plug-ins for your Web server."

- *Execute tools and include mechanisms that limit your exposure to vulnerabilities in external programs.*

Many of the known vulnerabilities in external programs are a result of poor programming practices and the use of such programs in environments that are not designed for secure operation. These include buffer overflows², misuse of character input³, and others⁴. Tools are available that

- scan for and identify the presence of problematic input characters
- serve as a “wrapper” around a potentially vulnerable external program, limiting possible inputs to avoid buffer overflows⁵

You should execute these in your test environment and review their results prior to deploying any external programs on your public Web site (and also on a regular basis once external programs are deployed).

Mechanisms such as the PERL interpreter’s “tainting” feature allow you to restrict operations (open files, system calls) when using user-supplied input.⁴

- *Mitigate the risk of distributing malicious code.*

Even if the Web server does not contain any vulnerabilities, it may inadvertently distribute malicious code to an unaware user. This is not necessarily a “server” problem as the results will almost always impact the user receiving the malicious or manipulated Web pages. However, attacks⁶ are possible that may reveal information to unauthorized users such as embedding references to other Web sites.

The problem, as described in CA-2000-02, *Malicious HTML Tags Embedded in Client Web Requests*,⁷ stems from the user sending a request from an untrustworthy source to a Web server. The source may be

- a Web page
- an email message
- a netnews message
- a Web page previously stored on disk or distributed via other media such as CD-ROM

2. Input data exceeds the size of its allocated program memory buffer because checks are lacking to ensure that the input data is not written beyond the buffer boundary. For examples, refer to CERT Advisory CA-99-07 (<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-07-IIS-Buffer-Overflow.html>) or CERT Advisory CA-97.24 (http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-97.24.Count_cgi.html).

3. Input characters change the way input data is interpreted or cause the execution of an unexpected function within the external program. Examples include “meta” characters that invoke a specific function instead of being used as input and “escape” characters that change the interpretation of the character which follows them. Quotation of character strings can also be a problem. For an example, refer to CERT Advisory CA-97.25 (http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-97.25.CGI_metachar.html).

4. Refer to the chapter “Secure CGI/API Programming,” pp. 293-310 in *Web Security & Commerce* [Garfinkel 97].

5. One example of such a program is CGIwrap, available at <http://www.unixtools.org/cgiwrap>.

6. These are often called cross site scripting attacks although this name does not correctly describe this problem.

7. Available at <http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html>.

The user's request may contain malicious data that is modified and sent back to the user's browser, where it can cause damage, execute programs, or present the requested page with missing or manipulated information.

There are controls which can help prevent the insertion of malicious code⁸ when they are built into the Web server. These controls can

- facilitate the appropriate encoding of all output elements
- filter content sent to the server
- check cookies

➤ *Disable or restrict the use of server side include functionality.*

Server side include functionality is used to reference dynamic information that is determined at the time a Web page is generated. Examples of functions that can be invoked through the use of server side includes are adding the timestamp of the last modification to the Web page and executing arbitrary external programs to produce text which is incorporated into the Web page. We recommend disabling all server side include functionality, where possible, to reduce the risk of intruders being able to access external programs or to place programs they created into your Web content for later execution.

If you need to selectively deploy some functions associated with server side includes, we recommend that you do not deploy those functions that enable the execution of external programs.

➤ *Disable the execution of external programs present in your Web server configuration.*

The execution of specific external programs is often called out in your default Web server configuration. You need to locate and disable any of these that are not essential. This includes disabling "example" scripts which may be useful for demonstration purposes but are not required for your operational configuration.

➤ *Configure Web server host operating system and Web server software access controls to restrict access to external programs.⁹*

Severely restrict access to all external program files that reside on your public Web server. None of these should be accessible by internal or external users requesting Web site content.

Typically, all external programs are located in the configured CGI-BIN directory. They can be directly invoked from that directory even if they are not referenced in one of your HTML pages. All the attacker needs to know is the name of the program or how to obtain responses that indicate whether or not the name guessing is successful.

8. Refer to http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/malicious_code_mitigation.html.

9. See also the practices "Configure the Web server with appropriate object, device, and file access controls" and "Configure computer operating systems with appropriate object, device, and file access controls" within the module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00].

Often, interpreters such as PERL are also placed in the CGI-BIN directory. While this may make installation easier, it is neither necessary nor recommended. Interpreters, shells, scripting engines, and other extensible programs should never reside in a CGI-BIN directory. In addition, you need to establish access controls that prohibit interpreters from being executed indirectly via CGI programs or scripts.¹⁰

- *Ensure that only authorized users can access external programs.*

All external programs should reside in directories that are tightly controlled and protected. Such directories should only be accessible by administrators who are responsible for installing, configuring, and maintaining these programs. The one exception to this is if your public Web site is designed for the purpose of supporting users who are authorized to provide their own functionality using such programs such as the generation and maintenance of private home pages for access by internal users.

- *Configure the Web server to execute external programs under unique individual user and group IDs.*

Assign separate and unique individual user and group IDs and access permissions for the execution of external programs. These IDs and permissions should not be the same as those assigned for normal Web server software execution. Doing so will aid in restricting external programs from performing unauthorized actions against the Web server or its content.

If this capability is not provided by your Web server host operating system or Web server software, other tools are available to support this, such as the use of chrootuid on Unix systems.

- *Restrict the access of external programs to only essential files.*

In addition to the execution access controls described above, you may need to further restrict the access of external programs to only those files that are required for such programs to perform their functions. These may include files within Web content directories and other external programs but should not include system files such as log files. You need to carefully review what files each external program can access to ensure that such access cannot be abused by an intruder.

- *Create cryptographic checksums or other integrity-checking information for all external programs.*

Use a tool (such as Tripwire¹¹) which checks the integrity of the system by tracking changes made when you install updates. By monitoring the changes made to external programs, you can determine if the changes were as you intended.

Refer to the modules *Detecting Signs of Intrusion* [Firth 97] and *Preparing to Detect Signs of Intrusion* [Kochmar 98] for additional information on the role of establishing a trusted baseline and checking the integrity of that baseline to support intrusion detection.

Policy considerations

Your organization's networked systems security policy should require a security evaluation as part of your Web server software selection and/or implementation processes.

10. See CERT Advisory CA-96.11 at http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-96.11.interpreters_in_cgi_bin_dir.html.

11. Refer to <http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/implementations/i002.02.html>.

Other information

CERT/CC advisories, summaries, vulnerability notes, and incident notes¹² may occasionally include information on new vulnerabilities in Web server software, including external programs.

Where to find updates

The latest version of this practice, plus implementation details for selected technologies, is available on the Web at URL

<http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/practices/p079.html>

¹². See <http://www.cert.org>.

6

Configure the Web server to use authentication and encryption technologies, where required.

Your public Web server may need to support a range of technologies for identifying and authenticating users with differing privileges for accessing information. Some of these technologies are based on cryptographic functions which, in addition, can provide an encrypted channel between a Web browser client and a Web server that supports encryption. Candidate technologies include SSL (Secure Socket Layer), S/HTTP (Secure Hypertext Transport Protocol), and SET (Secure Electronic Transaction).¹

Before placing any sensitive or restricted (i.e., not for public consumption) information on your public Web server, you need to determine the specific security and protection requirements and confirm that the available technologies can meet these requirements.

You may need to install additional cryptographic enhancements or choose alternate Web server software depending on your requirements.

Why this is important

Without strong user authentication, you will not be able to restrict access to specific information by authorized users. All information that resides on your public Web server will be accessible by anyone who accesses that server.

Without strong server authentication, users of your public Web server are not able to determine if they have connected to an authentic Web server or a bogus version operated by an intruder. In such cases, the user may receive false information and act upon it based on the assumption that it originated from your Web server. The user may also provide sensitive information such as a credit card number.

Encryption can be used to protect information traversing the connection between a Web browser client and a public Web server. Without encryption, anyone with access to network traffic (accomplished via the use of a sniffer) can determine, and possibly alter, the content of sensitive and restricted information, even if the user accessing the information has been carefully authenticated. This may violate the confidentiality and integrity of critical information.

1. Refer to *Secure Electronic Commerce* [Ford 97] for a more detailed discussion of the various protocols and related topics, such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and certificates.

How to do it

- *Determine the access requirements for sensitive or restricted information that needs to be available via your public Web server.²*

Review all information objects accessible via your public Web server and determine their specific security requirements. In the process of doing so, identify information objects that share the same security and protection requirements. For sensitive or restricted information objects, determine the users or user groups that have a legitimate need to access each set of objects.

Implement one or more of the steps described below to meet your security requirements.

If you are planning a new Web site or an enhancement to an existing site, you may want to anticipate the need for providing limited access to specific information (by specific users, user groups, or by subscription). This requires implementing one or more of the technologies described in the following steps.

- *Understand the importance of establishing trust between clients (users) and Web servers.*

External users (clients) need to be sure that:³

- they are communicating with the correct server
- what they send is delivered unmodified
- they can prove that they sent the message
- only the intended receiver can read the message
- delivery is guaranteed

The Web server needs to be sure that:

- it is communicating with the right client
- the content of the received message is correct
- the identity of the author is unmistakable
- only the real author could have written the message
- it acknowledges receipt of the message

- *Understand the limitations of address-based authentication.*

Most server software supports access controls based on IP addresses or hostnames.

However, IP spoofing and DNS spoofing limit the effectiveness of these controls.

Authentication and encryption should be used in addition to or in place of IP address or hostname access checking whenever possible.

2. See also the practices “Configure the Web server with appropriate object, device, and file access controls” in this module, and “Configure computer operating systems with appropriate object, device, and file access controls” available in the module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00].

3. This material is taken from the article “Web of Worries” [Kessler 00].

➤ *Understand authentication and encryption technologies and when each should be used.*

Based on the well-established standards, there are a limited number of technologies available to restrict access to information residing on a public Web site. These are:

1. Basic Authentication

This technology utilizes the Web server content's directory structure. Typically, all files in the same directory are configured with the same access privileges. A requesting user provides a recognized user ID and password for access to files in a given directory. More restrictive access control can be enforced at the level of a single file within in a directory, given that the Web server software provides this capability. Each vendor's Web server software has its own method and syntax for defining and using this basic authentication mechanism.

From a security perspective, the main drawback of this technology is that all password information is transferred in an encoded form rather than an encrypted form. Anyone who knows the standardized encoding scheme⁴ can decode the password after capturing it with a network sniffer. Furthermore, any Web content is transmitted as unencrypted plaintext, so this content can be captured as well, violating confidentiality.

Basic Authentication is supported by any standard-compliant Web browser.

2. Secure Socket Layer (SSL)⁵

SSL is composed of two sub-protocols called SSL record protocol and SSL handshake protocol. The handshake protocol is used to exchange any information about cryptographic capabilities and keys used. The record protocol is used to exchange the actual data.

SSL provides a range of security services:

- server authentication
- client authentication (optional)
- integrity
- confidentiality

SSL uses public key cryptography. Certificate authorities can be used to verify the relationship between users and organizations. CAs can also be used to verify a specific user's relationship to specific server keys. Both of these verification actions allow users of the CA to have a higher level of trust in the relationships and the keys based on the user's trust in the CA and the CA's compliance with regulations directing their actions.⁶

The SSL protocol resides at the transport layer, effectively being "plugged" between the Web server/browser and TCP/IP. As a result, it also has the potential to protect other TCP services such as FTP, SMTP, and telnet.

4. Known as base64, described in RFC 2167 HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication available at <http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html>.

5. Indicated by the use of URLs beginning "https://www.xyz.net"

6. Browsers often come with a pre-installed list of CAs. Based on the pre-installed configuration, the browser accepts SSL certificates as "trusted" without alerting the user. Users therefore need to manually remove any CA key which they do not want to accept as "trusted".

SSL is in the process of becoming an IETF⁷ (Internet Engineering Task Force) standard under the name TLS (Transport Level Security). SSL is supported by most of the well-known Web browsers.

3. Secure HTTP (S/HTTP)⁸

Secure HTTP is an alternative approach to SSL, developed in 1993-94 (earlier than SSL). It was designed to be an security enhancement of the HTTP protocol and includes the following features:

- authentication
- encryption
- cryptographic checksums
- digital signatures

Secure HTTP has greater functionality than SSL because it is integrated into the HTTP protocol, but users need to install a specific Web browser to use S/HTTP.

As reference implementations became available, SSL became the preferred choice of major vendors, resulting in S/HTTP receding into the background.

4. Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)

Developed by two major credit card companies, SET provides a protocol and infrastructure specification that supports bank payments which can be integrated into any Web site. SET provides the following capabilities⁹:

- encrypts payment instructions that precludes exposure of a user's credit card number (on the network and on the merchant's system)
- authenticates merchants to users to protect against imposters
- optionally provides authentication of users to protect against unauthorized persons who attempt to initiate a bank payment

SET depends on the infrastructure elements which certify the use of keys and the relationship between users, merchants, banks, etc. and the appropriate keys.

To use SET, the user needs to obtain a software tool (often called a wallet) and other supporting information from his credit card organization.

The technologies described above can be used to meet a range of security requirements. They can be deployed individually or in conjunction with one another.

7. Refer to <http://www.ietf.org>

8. Indicated by the use of URLs beginning "shttp://www.xyz.net"

9. The infrastructure necessary to support SET is complex; the details are not included here.

Table 1 provides an indication of the requirements that can be satisfied by technology currently in use.

Table 1: Security requirements supported by authentication and encryption technologies

Technology/ Requirement	Basic Authentication	SSL	SET
User Authentication	yes (cleartext passwords)	optional (certificates)	optional (certificates)
Server Authentication	no	yes (certificates)	yes (certificates)
Confidentiality	no	yes	yes (for credit card information)
Integrity	no	yes (with Server Authentication)	yes

In selecting authentication and encryption technologies, consider the following guidelines:

- Basic Authentication can be used to authenticate users. SSL encryption needs to be added to protect against sniffers and intruders posing as authorized users.
- SSL User Authentication provides a “stronger” solution than Basic Authentication. This technology provides a more secure and complete description of a user’s attributes and it does not rely on users remembering their passwords. It does, however, require some form of PKI for verifying certificates and managing keys.
- Choose SET if only credit card information needs to be protected. The use of SET requires cooperation with the banking industry. SSL provides a much simpler solution if you only need to protect the transfer of credit card information against sniffers.
- To protect users against bogus Web sites (posing as a site that they are not), use SSL server authentication in conjunction with a SSL server certificate from a trusted CA.
- Use SSL to protect against network sniffers and the unauthorized alteration of Web content during transmission.

- *Install and configure the Web server software to support the use of SSL if confidentiality is needed.*

SSL is typically not included with most Web server software. Therefore, you will need to add an available plug-in or extension or replace your Web server software with another product that includes SSL. You may want to consider implementing the SSL-enabled version of your Web server software on another host. This is consistent with a previous guideline to have separate services reside on different hosts¹⁰; however, it might not be practical to maintain your public Web site’s content on two different machines.

If you do choose to install and deploy SSL-enabled Web server software, all practices contained in this module apply and need to be followed.

10. See also the practice “Isolate the Web server from public networks and your organization’s internal networks.”

- *Create a SSL server key and the related certificate request. Arrange for a CA to provide a certificate for your public SSL server key.*

An SSL-enabled Web server encrypts the data that is exchanged between browser and server. This encryption does not by itself ensure the authenticity of the connection. Other parties could intercept the connection and pretend to be your organization's SSL Web server, providing false information when service is requested.

Verifying the authenticity of a SSL Web server depends on either distributing the public SSL server key in a secure manner to all users or requesting a certificate from a trusted third party (certificate authority) where the CA verifies that the public key does indeed belong to the specified Web server.¹¹

Typically, SSL-enabled Web browsers come with a list of recognized CAs. By arranging with one of these authorities to sign your public SSL Web server key, you can allow users to verify that the connection they have established is truly with your Web server.

- *Configure your Web server software to support the use of SSL and basic authentication if users need to be authenticated.*

Assuming that you have deployed SSL to encrypt the connection between a browser and your public Web server and that you have deployed the use of certificates to authenticate the server side of any connection, you can now use basic authentication to further authenticate the user to the Web server. The user ID and password¹² are passed in a SSL-encrypted form (therefore protected) and any request can then be granted or denied based on their legitimacy.

- *Configure your Web server software to support the use of SSL client certificates if stronger authentication is needed.*

If a stronger authentication mechanism is needed (given that user passwords can be easily broken), consider using SSL client certificates.

The use of client certificates requires that all users have a personal SSL client key which is then signed by a CA. The CA can be internal to your organization (requires resources, personal, expertise) or a trusted third party.

SSL client certificates are best used in conjunction with smart cards. This provides effective protection of the user's keys. At the same time they support the use of these keys on all workstations (as opposed to only the user's personal workstation if the key is stored on the workstation's hard disk).

- *Configure the Web server to support the use of SSL or SET if credit card information needs to be transmitted.*

The transmission of credit card information must be done in a very secure manner. This can be done using either SSL or SET.

11. The details of this certification process are covered under the broader topic of operating a public key infrastructure (PKI). This topic is complex, controversial, and considered out of scope for this practice.

12. Password policies such as login limits, minimum password length, diverse character set, and password expiration time apply here (although such policies must be explicitly set because they are not supported by default).

SSL may be the most straightforward technology to apply, especially if you already have a SSL-enabled Web server. Credit card information can be safely transmitted between the Web browser and the Web server based on the SSL server certificate and the use of encryption.

Unencrypted credit card information may reside on the Web server during a transaction. We strongly recommend that you transfer this information to a more secure system for any further processing and remove this information from your public Web server as soon as possible. If you intend to keep and process credit card information on your public Web server, it must be encrypted to ensure its confidentiality. Use public key technology to avoid compromising private/secret keys, which are required when using private key technology.

SET provides additional benefits when compared to SSL. Public Web sites do not receive the credit card information; it is passed directly and electronically to the SET infrastructure (banks, etc.). The payment is handled automatically via credit card. This minimizes the effort required to transfer credit card information from one system (SSL) to another. We recommend the use of SET for e-commerce sites that have large numbers of credit card transactions.

Policy considerations

Your organization's networked systems security policy should require

- a procedure for ensuring that all information is reviewed prior to posting on your public Web site
- access to sensitive or restricted information via your public Web site is protected at the level required (using, for example, the encryption and authentication technologies described above)

Other information

User training is required to ensure that sensitive or restricted information is not inadvertently placed on your public Web site in a directory that provides broad public access. You will likely want to establish procedures that require at least two people to review all material on a "preview" server prior to public posting.

This practice does not discuss the strength of cryptographic algorithms used in SSL and SET. Up until fairly recently, encryption software exported from the US was restricted to keys of no more than 40 bits (later this became 56 bits). This restriction will be lifted shortly for public domain products and products for the mass market as a result of new legislation.

Both SSL and SET protocols provide strong security against attacks on confidentiality and authenticity. This conclusion is based on the standards for SSL and SET as well as expert consensus regarding the underlying cryptographic algorithms. In the past, several SSL-related vulnerabilities were discovered. These were based on implementation errors and do not indicate weaknesses in the underlying protocol.

Other cryptographic approaches are available, but they lack wide public acceptance and use:

- Digest Authentication was introduced with Apache 1.1 for HTTP/1.1 to complement Basic Authentication. It is based on the MD5 message digest algorithm (henceforth the name) and a shared secret. Technically, it is a challenge response approach which solves the problem of cleartext transmission. However, MD5 is falling into disfavor due to the reduced effort necessary to find collisions (two text strings having the same MD5 message digest).

Depending on the implementation, Digest Authentication may provide protection against replay attacks—or it may not. For example, if the server does not keep track of distributed challenges, no protection is provided.

- Pretty Good Privacy¹³ (as well as other software producing ASCII digital signatures) can be used to authenticate Web pages. To do so, the PGP-specific lines containing delimiters as well as the digital signature can be “hidden” from the Web browser by surrounding them with HTML comment statements. In order to check the authenticity of the Web page, the user has to run PGP after saving the Web page on his computer.
- Digital watermarking is a software method used to mark graphic and sound files for later verification of origin and ownership. It is performed in a manner such that the marking is not noticeable to the user. Accompanying software at the browser end can be executed to verify the author or owner of a graphic or sound file. This permits the distribution of these file types while protecting the interests of the owner.

Where to find updates

The latest version of this practice, plus implementation details for selected technologies, is available on the Web at URL

<http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/practices/p080.html>

13. <http://www.pgp.com>

7

Maintain the authoritative copy of your Web site content on a secure host.

The authoritative (i.e., verified, correct, trusted) copy of your public Web site content needs to be stored on a host that is separate from (and more secure than) your public Web server. The more secure host will likely be one that is on your internal network and protected behind one or more firewalls.

If the integrity of the information on your public Web server is ever compromised, you can restore it from the authoritative copy using a secure transfer procedure.

Why this is important

News reports regularly describe intruder attacks on well-known, commercial Web sites, causing them, at the very least, to be defaced, and possibly causing them to present erroneous information that appears to be accurate. Organizations that rely on their Web sites to transact business must be able to quickly restore them to their authentic version; otherwise, they run the risk of losing business and customer confidence.

The authoritative copy of your public Web site content is less likely to be compromised by an intruder if it is stored in a more secure location. As a result, it will likely be correct and available when you need to restore the publicly-accessible version.

How to do it

- *Restrict the number of users with access to the authoritative version of your public Web site's content.*

This should include only those users authorized to create and update Web content and perform whatever administration tasks are necessary to ensure the secure operation of the server where the content resides.

All authorized users should receive adequate training in the secure creation and maintenance of Web site content and have the opportunity to safely work with Web content to gain experience (perhaps with a partner or mentor).

The list of authorized users should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis, particularly when an authorized user leaves your organization.

- *Implement and enforce access controls at the level of Web content subdirectories.*

Your public Web server content will likely be divided into different subdirectories, such as those containing home page information, project-related materials, and CGI scripts and programs. Implementing individual user and group access controls at the level of these subdirectories (and below if necessary) will further protect your Web content.

- *Enforce the use of strong user authentication before granting access to the authoritative version.*

Once users gain access to your authoritative version, there will likely be no further attempts to authenticate those users. Therefore, you need to ensure this has been accomplished prior to granting access. Strong authentication technologies include smart cards or some other form of token, one-time passwords, and biometrics.

- *Configure your public Web server to accept an authenticated and encrypted connection initiated by the secure host where the authoritative copy is stored.*

If you choose to transfer the authoritative copy of your public Web server content via a network, you need to implement the following security measures:

- Initiate all connections to the public Web server by the secure host (not by the public Web server). This prevents the public Web server from being used to launch an attack directed towards the secure host.
 - Implement firewall technology to limit the connectivity between the secure host and the public Web server to allow only the transfer of authoritative Web server content. You can use filtering proxies that are protocol-aware (such as those available for FTP) to accomplish this.
 - Use cryptographic measures to encrypt and authenticate the transferred content. We recommend the use of virtual private networks or similar technologies.
 - Additional measures such as restricting transfer time can further improve security for this type of transaction.
- *Establish manual procedures to transfer the authoritative copy of the Web server content if you are unable to use a network.*

You need to develop alternative procedures for transferring Web content from the secure host where the authoritative copy resides to your public Web server whenever the use of a network is not possible. This may be due to higher priority or overriding security requirements or technical problems such as the unavailability of appropriate virtual private network technology.

Such procedures may include:

- storing an encrypted ZIP archive on disk or CD-ROM and uploading the files directly at the public Web server's console (with appropriate authentication and access controls)
- transferring an encrypted ZIP archive on disk or CD-ROM to another workstation within the internal network, using the workstation's connectivity to upload the files to the public Web server.

Using write-once read-many (WORM) media (such as CD-ROM) is preferred over media that can be re-written.

Policy considerations

Your organization's networked systems security policy should require that

- identical, authoritative copies are securely maintained for all information residing on public servers. This includes the current version of public server content as well as previous versions and their update/transfer history.¹

1. Include the transfer date, time, user id, reason for the transfer, and any related observations.

- the transfer of authoritative content to public servers uses strong authentication and encryption

Other information

We strongly recommend against the use of remote authoring tools for content directly residing on your public Web site. However, you may be able to securely deploy these tools for use within the more protected environment where the authoritative copy resides if appropriate authentication and access control mechanisms are enforced.

Where to find updates

The latest version of this practice, plus implementation details for selected technologies, is available on the Web at URL

<http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/practices/p081.html>

8

Protect your Web server against common attacks.

Your public Web site not only gives high visibility to your organization — it also serves as an attractive target for attackers. Attackers can target

- the Web server host operating system
- Web server software
- programs, scripts, or plug-ins used by Web server software
- firewalls and routers that protect your public Web site and your internal network. This includes Internet Service Providers and other organizations providing network services.

Attacker objectives may include:

- gaining direct access to your Web server
- changing Web site contents
- denying user access to your Web server¹

Other modules describe, in general, how to detect signs of intrusion² and how to respond when such signs are detected.³ This practice provides additional guidance in dealing with attacks specifically against public Web servers.

Why this is important

Your organization must anticipate the occurrence of attacks and be prepared to deal with those directed against your public Web site. If these attacks are successful and you are not prepared, your organization may suffer the consequences of a defaced, inaccurate, or unavailable Web site. These could include being unable to conduct business and result in a loss of customer confidence and reputation.

How to do it

- *Regularly review publicly available information on recent security vulnerabilities and incidents.*

Various organizations research network and system security topics and periodically publish information concerning recently-discovered vulnerabilities in service software. This includes Web server software and supporting technologies such as scripting languages and external programs.

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1. See also the practice “Configure the Web server with appropriate object, device, and file access controls.”
 2. See *Preparing to Detect Signs of Intrusion* [Kochmar 98], and *Detecting Signs of Intrusion* [Firth 97].
 3. See *Responding to Intrusions* [Kossakowski 99].

External programs that are in wide scale use are regularly analyzed by researchers, users, and security incident response teams as well as by members of the intruder community. Intruders often publish exploit scripts that take advantage of known vulnerabilities in Web service software and external programs commonly used by public Web servers. You need to review public information sources frequently and be aware of all relevant security information that will aid you in configuring and updating your public Web server.

➤ *Update your security controls to mitigate against new attacks and vulnerabilities.*

In addition to previously described guidelines⁴, you will likely need to take some or all of the following actions as a result of new vulnerability and attack information:

- update your detection tools to detect new attack patterns or events (resulting from new or updated attacks taking advantage of new vulnerabilities)
- mitigate attacks by updating firewall filtering mechanisms to deny new attacks
- temporarily disable specific services that might be vulnerable to attack

➤ *Augment your alerting procedures.*

In addition to the guidelines contained in *Responding to Intrusions* [Kossakowski 99], ensure that your public Web server administrators and firewall administrators are involved and in close communication during the investigation of an attack.

➤ *Work with your network provider to determine how your organization can mitigate damages due to distributed denial of service attacks.*⁵

Recent Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks show that organizations can easily become victims of DDOS attacks regardless of the protective measures they take or the resources they expend on them. Even if you implement all possible measures, the lack of adequate protective measures taken by others may allow DDOS attacks to reach your organization.

DDOS attack tools often take advantage of IP spoofing (forging source addresses in IP packets). Protecting against IP spoofing at all network interconnection points can help mitigate against these attacks.⁶ This includes routers used to connect to any public network as well as routers used by your organization's ISP or the backbone provider of the ISP.

If many distributed nodes (sites, hosts) are sending their spoofed packets to attack your network, these packets, upon arrival, can consume a significant portion (or all) of your available network bandwidth.

4. Refer to the practice "Keep operating systems and applications software up to date" within the module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00].

5. Refer to "Results of the Distributed-Systems Intruder Tools Workshop," available at http://www.cert.org/reports/dsit_workshop-final.html.

6. IP addresses recognized as spoofed usually fall into the range of the IP addresses registered to the attacked organization. (For an individual organization as well as an ISP, IP addresses outside this controlled address space cannot be recognized without the cooperation of others.) Applying appropriate incoming packet filters on IP source address reduces the means for attack that depend on spoofed IP addresses. Using reverse (outgoing packet) filters can help reduce spoofing attacks originating from your site against other sites. If you detect an attack, be careful in accusing another organization of attacking you. Further analysis may show that addresses from their IP address range were misused by an attacker.

Even if your public Web server is resistant to the direct attack, users will be unable to connect to your Web server due to the lack of an available connection.

It is important to work with your ISP or internal network provider to understand what precautions have been taken to

- protect against DDOS attacks, including disabling IP spoofing attacks and denying traffic from broadcast/multicast addresses
- detect DDOS attacks
- respond to DDOS attacks

If many customers can convince their network providers to apply protective measures, all organizations will benefit from a considerably lower number of potential attacks than exists today.

Your network provider may be able to provide you with a specific configuration that uses multiple connections built from different network backbones. In the event of a DDOS attack, you can switch your public Web server to another connection. This feature, along with appropriate network management support, may reduce the damage caused by a DDOS attack.

Policy considerations

Follow your site-specific policies related to detecting signs of intrusion and attack. If you detect any, report them to your organization's designated point of contact and follow any policies on responding to such events.

Refer to the modules *Detecting Signs of Intrusion* [Firth 97], *Preparing to Detect Signs of Intrusion* [Kochmar 98], and *Responding to Intrusions* [Kossakowski 99].

Other information

CERT/CC advisories, summaries, vulnerability notes, and incident notes⁷ may occasionally include information on new vulnerabilities, recent attacks, tools, and trends relevant to Web server software.

Refer to the practice "Keep operating systems and applications software up to date" within the module *Securing Network Servers* [Allen 00], and to the implementation "Maintaining currency by periodically reviewing public and vendor information sources" available at <http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/implementations/i040.01.html>.

Where to find updates

The latest version of this practice, plus implementation details for selected technologies, is available on the Web at URL

<http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/practices/p082.html>

7. See <http://www.cert.org>.

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